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I AM WOMAN, HEAR ME ROAR: DENIAL OF SEXUAL
REASSIGNMENT SURGERY FOR TRANSGENDER INMATES AND
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S BAN ON CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
Chiara Haueter*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Adree Edmo. Vanessa Lynn Gibson. Michelle Kosilek. These
are the names of three transgender women currently incarcerated
within the United States prison system. 1 They have been fighting for
their right to receive life changing gender confirmation surgery that
will successfully alleviate the severe symptoms associated with their
gender dysphoria diagnoses. 2 The United States prison system does
not view gender confirmation surgery as medically necessary for
transgender individuals with diagnoses of gender dysphoria, but the
medical community largely disagrees. 3 The basis of these women’s

*

Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2022; State
University of New York at New Paltz, B.A in Political Science, 2017. I would like
to give many thanks to my faculty advisor, Professor Meredith Miller for her help in
formulating the idea for this Note, as well as her continued guidance throughout the
writing and editing process. I would also like to thank my notes editors, Alessandra
Albano and Katherine Carroll, and the editorial board and entire staff of the Touro
Law Review for their support and help in preparing this Note for publication. I would
also like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for the opportunity to participate on the
Touro Law Review and for the ability to write this Note. Lastly, I want to thank my
friends and family for their continued support in this process.
1
Edmo v. Corizon, 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212
(5th Cir. 2019); Kosilek v. Spencer 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
2
Although the courts use the term “sex reassignment surgery,” this Note will use the
term “gender confirmation surgery” throughout its entirety as it is the preferred term
given by the World Professional Association for Transgender Health Standards of
Care and the transgender community.
3
WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF
CARE FOR THE HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER
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fight lies in the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment and their argument that denying them access to obtain
gender confirmation surgery constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.4
Since its holding Estelle v. Gamble5 the Supreme Court has
long held that punishment is cruel and unusual when an inmate has a
serious medical need and prison officials are deliberately indifferent to
that medical need. 6 Gender confirmation surgery is a controversial
subject within both the legal and medical communities as society has
become increasingly more aware and accepting of transgender
individuals and their needs.7 In Edmo v. Corizon,8 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals was the first court to hold that denial of gender
confirmation surgery for a transgender inmate violates the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.9 In Edmo, the
Ninth Circuit gave considerable deference to the medical community’s
acceptance of the World Professional Association for Transgender
Health Standards of Care for transgender individuals in addition to the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistics
Manual’s definition of gender dysphoria. 10 The Ninth Circuit’s
holding created a split among the circuit courts that have decided the
same issue.11 The First and Fifth Circuits have both held that there is
no Eighth Amendment violation when transgender inmates are denied
sex reassignment surgery. 12 While both circuits recognized that gender
NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 67 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter WPATH STANDARDS OF
CARE].
4
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 2059
(2015); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2019), cert denied, 140 S. Ct.
653 (2019); Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 775 (9th Cir. 2019), cert denied,
141 S. Ct. 610 (2020).
5
429 U.S. 97 (1976).
6
Id. at 98.
7
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 78 (discussing medical expert’s strong alternate views to sex
reassignment surgery); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 216 (stating that medical professionals
and the prison system disagree with sex reassignment surgery); cf. Edmo, 935 F.3d
at 769-70 (stating that World Professional Association Standards of Care are the
internationally recognized and accepted standards of care, and that the majority
opinion of the medical community is that gender confirmation surgery is safe,
effective, and medically necessary for some transgender individuals).
8
Edmo, 935 F.3d 757.
9
Id. at 767; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10
935 F.3d at 769.
11
See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96; see also Gibson, 920 F.3d at 228.
12
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219.
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dysphoria is a medical condition that creates a serious medical need,
both also deemed gender confirmation surgery as not medically
necessary due to the existence of less extreme remedies that they
viewed as equally effective in relieving the severe symptoms
associated with gender dysphoria.13 Additionally, both circuits held
that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent regarding the
medical need for gender confirmation surgery for transgender
inmates.14
This Note will focus on the rights of transgender inmates with
severe gender dysphoria to receive gender confirmation surgery by
examining the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment and the medical community’s acceptance of the World
Professional Association for Transgender Health Standards of Care
(“WPATH Standards of Care”). It will address the severe symptoms
that are common with diagnoses of gender dysphoria and how gender
confirmation surgery can greatly alleviate those symptoms. This Note
will argue that denial of gender confirmation surgery of transgender
inmates with severe gender dysphoria is a violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. This Note will
further argue that the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari in
at least one of the three cases to decide the issue. This Note will also
propose a rule that gender confirmation surgery should be provided to
a transgender inmate when there is a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and
the requirements under the WPATH Standards of Care for eligibility
of gender confirmation surgery are met.
This Note will be divided into seven parts. Part II will provide
the history and values of the Eighth Amendment. It will also examine
the Supreme Court’s holding in Estelle v. Gamble and its two-prong
test for determining when a punishment is cruel and unusual. Part III
will discuss how gender dysphoria is defined under the American
Psychiatric Association’s DSM-5. Part IV will discuss the WPATH
Standards of Care and its increased acceptance within the medical
community as the leading guidance for transgender health and wellbeing. Part V will discuss the Ninth Circuit’s holding and opinion in
Edmo v. Corizon. It will also discuss the creation of the circuit split
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 89; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221 (discussing the First Circuit’s
opinion in Kosilek that there are other less extreme measures available for Gibson
that were provided to Kosilek, such as hormones, electrolysis, feminine clothing and
accessories, and mental health services).
14
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 223.
13
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and examine the First and Fifth Circuits holdings in Kosilek v.
Spencer 15 and Gibson v. Collier,16 respectively. Part VI will discuss
why the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to decide the
issue and will propose a rule that gender confirmation surgery should
be provided for transgender inmates with gender dysphoria diagnoses
and who meet the requirements for gender confirmation surgery under
the WPATH Standards of Care. Finally, Part VII will conclude the
Note.
II.

THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S BAN ON CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
A.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Defined

The Eighth Amendment states that “excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”17 The purpose of the Eighth Amendment is to
protect people from both cruel and unusual punishments and
treatments while incarcerated. 18 Although the Eighth Amendment
originally protected from harsh punishments, it has been expanded to
include treatment of inmates in prison. 19 The Supreme Court
established a definition of cruel and unusual punishment in the 1976
case of Estelle v. Gamble.20 In Estelle, the respondent Gamble claimed
a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights when prison officials
denied him treatment for injuries sustained while performing a prison
work assignment.21 The Court held that “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”22
The Court stated that the legislative history and changing views of
modern society shapes its interpretation of what constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.23 The Eighth Amendment extends beyond
physically cruel and unusual punishment, and “proscribes more than
15

774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019).
17
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 98.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169-73 (1976)).
23
Id.
16
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physically barbarous punishments.”24 The punishment should be
proportionate to the sentence, as “[t]he Amendment embodies ‘broad
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and
decency . . . ,’ against which we must evaluate penal measures.” 25
Additionally, the Court noted that “[w]e have held repugnant to the
Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with ‘the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society, or which ‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain.’”26
The Court in Estelle also unambiguously stated what would not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment: medical malpractice or
simple negligence on the part of a medical professional. 27 Likewise,
an “unforeseeable accident” will not be sufficient to constitute a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 28 Although an accident may
create additional suffering, that suffering alone does not characterize
“wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.”29 An unintentional failure to
provide adequate medical care will similarly not be sufficient to
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. 30 Ultimately, to state a
cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment, “a prisoner must
allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference that
can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.”31
B.

Deliberate Indifference and Medical Care of

24

Id. at 102.
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
26
Id. at 102-03 (first quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); then quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
27
Id. at 104.
28
Id. at 105. The Court cited , La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)
as an example of an accident that does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.
The Court concluded that there was no Eighth Amendment violation when a second
electrocution attempt moved forward after a medical malfunction thwarted the first
attempt. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 105-06.
31
Id. at 106.
25
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Prisoners
Estelle’s “deliberate indifference” test is used to decide
whether an inmate had access to adequate medical care. 32 In order to
prove an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must satisfy a two
prong test: “(1) an objective prong that requires proof of a serious
medical need, and (2) a subjective prong that mandates a showing of
prison administrators’ deliberate indifference to that need.” 33 The
inmate must show that the medical need is one that has been diagnosed
by a medical doctor as needing treatment, or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would recognize the need for a medical
professional’s attention. 34 The subjective prong can be shown by
proving that there was a deliberate indifference through a “wanton
disregard” to the inmate’s needs, although the disregard must be so
substantial that it requires a conscious risk of easily preventable
impending harm.35 The inmate must prove deliberate indifference by
showing an act or omission that fails to respond to an inmate’s medical
need and that the harm suffered by the inmate was caused by that act
or omission.36
General agreement and acceptance among the medical
community for care and practice are “highly relevant in determining
what care is medically acceptable and unacceptable.”37 A difference
of opinion between a physician and an inmate, or between physicians
will not constitute what is medically acceptable and therefore will not
be sufficient to prove deliberate indifference for an Eighth Amendment
claim.38 However, the insufficiency will only hold weight if the
opinions of those physicians are both medically acceptable under the
circumstances.39
Over the past two decades, the medical community relied
largely on the WPATH Standards of Care regarding treatment for
transgender individuals diagnosed with gender dysphoria, 40 including
32

Id. at 97.
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 83.
36
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp.3d 1164, 1186 (N.D. Ca. 2015).
37
Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019).
38
Id.
39
Id. (emphasis added).
40
Id. at 769.
33
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when gender confirmation surgery (“GCS”) is medically necessary. 41
While the medical community has increasingly relied on the WPATH
Standards of Care, the judicial system has not been as quick to defer. 42
This means that, for transgender inmates, availability of GCS as
medically necessary while incarcerated is a topic hotly debated and
wildly controversial within the legal community. 43
III.

GENDER DYSPHORIA DEFINED

Generally, whether a person is eligible for GCS is determined
based on a diagnosis of gender dysphoria under the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistics Manual (“DSM5”).44 For incarcerated transgender inmates, a diagnosis of gender
dysphoria and the severity of that diagnosis without the possibility for
GCS can mean living a life filled with constant mental and emotional
anguish, self-hatred, and attempts at self-harm, including suicide and
self-castration.45
Gender dysphoria is defined as a marked incongruence
between one’s experienced or expressed gender and assigned gender
at birth.46 Diagnosis for gender dysphoria requires that this
incongruence must have a duration of at least six months, and must be
manifested by at least two of the marked criteria stated in the DSM5.47 Additionally, the incongruence must also be causing pain and
41

WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 3.
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014); Gibson v. Collier 920 F.3d 212
(5th Cir. 2019). But see Edmo, 935 F.3d 757.
43
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-74; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 216; Edmo, 936 F.3d at 769.
44
AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STAT. MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 452
(5th ed. 2013).
45
Id. at 455.
46
Id.
47
Id. The criteria in the DSM-5 for gender dysphoria are:
42

(1) a marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender,
and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics; (2) a strong desire to be
rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a
marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender; (3) a
strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of the
other gender; (4) a strong desire to be of the other gender (or some
alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender; (5) a strong desire
to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative gender different from
one’s assigned gender); (6) a strong conviction that one has the typical
feelings and reactions of the other gender (or some alternative gender
different from one’s assigned gender).
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suffering.48 Gender dysphoria is generally associated with significant
mental and emotional agony or impairment in social, occupational, or
other important areas of functioning. 49 In adults, “this distress
manifests because of the strong incongruence between the experienced
gender and somatic sex.”50 However, the physical and emotional
torment based on the incongruence can be mitigated or alleviated by
supportive environments and “knowledge that biomedical treatments
exists to reduce the incongruence.”51 The standards of care within the
realm of transgender individuals has consistently been moving toward
the standards of care suggested by the WPATH Standards of Care
within the last two decades. 52
IV.

WORLD PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION
HEALTH STANDARDS OF CARE
A.

FOR

TRANSGENDER

Purpose and Goal of the SOC

The World Professional Association for Transgender Health is
a worldwide association whose purpose is to promote several different
areas of transgender health. 53 The WPATH Standards of Care state
that one of its main functions is “to promote the highest standards of
health care for individuals through the articulation of WPATH
Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and
Gender Nonconforming People.”54 The Standards of Care are based
on “the best available science and expert professional consensus.”55
The overall goal of the WPATH Standards of Care is to provide
clinical guidance for medical professionals to assist transgender people
with “safe and effective pathways to achieving lasting personal
comfort with their gendered selves, in order to maximize their overall
health, psychological well-being, and self-fulfillment.”56 Clinical
Id.
48
Id. at 453.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 455.
51
Id. (emphasis added).
52
WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 3, at 1.
53
Id. “[A]n international, multidisciplinary, professional association whose mission
is to promote evidence-based care, education, research, advocacy, public policy, and
respect in transsexual and transgender health.” Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
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guidance includes various types of care, including hormonal and
surgical treatments.57 Further, the WPATH Standards of Care state
that while the standards are primarily for medical professionals, they
can, and should, also be used by social institutions to better understand
how to aid and promote the wellbeing of transgender individuals.58
The WPATH Standards of Care explain that while the
standards are flexible, they offer “optimal health care and guiding
treatment of people experiencing gender dysphoria.”59 Treatment is
individualized on the severity of the person’s diagnosis.60 Hormone
therapy or surgery can effectively alleviate an individual’s gender
dysphoria and is medically necessary for many people because it
significantly reduces comorbid conditions that are generally associated
with gender dysphoria and allows individuals to live a life as their
expressed gender.61
B.

When is Gender Confirmation Surgery Medically
Necessary

Effective treatments for relieving symptoms of gender
dysphoria range from regular psychotherapy to more permanent and
extreme remedies such as hormone injections and gender confirmation
surgery62 GCS brings physical changes to the body and an individual’s
primary and secondary sex characteristics.63 While many transgender
individuals can find comfort with their gender identity and expression
without surgery, for others surgery is essential and medically necessary
in order to alleviate their gender dysphoria. 64 For those who cannot
mitigate their gender dysphoria through psychotherapy alone, a change
in primary or secondary sex characteristics is necessary to achieve
greater congruence with their gender identity. 65 Several post-surgery
follow-up studies have shown an “undeniable beneficial effect of

57

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
59
Id. at 2; see supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text for a definition of gender
dysphoria.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 54.
65
Id.
58
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gender confirmation surgery on postoperative outcomes.” 66 The
WPATH Standards of Care emphasize that GCS is not an elective
surgery, and that an assessment of the individual by mental health
professionals should determine whether GCS is medically necessary. 67
The WPATH Standards of Care set out specific guidelines to
determine when GCS is medically necessary.
When transgender individuals express a desire for GCS, they
must go through a series of mental and physical evaluations that will
determine if reconstructive surgery is medically necessary. 68 While
the standards for GCS recommendation are largely individualized,
each potential candidate for surgery must have medical documentation
of persistent gender dysphoria. 69 Persistent gender dysphoria means
that a patient must exhibit significant distress because they are unable
to live a complete life as their experienced or expressed gender. 70 The
general threshold criteria for both male-to-female and female-to-male
transitions are “(1) persistent, well-documented gender dysphoria; (2)
capacity to make a fully informed decision and to consent for
treatment; (3) age of majority; and (4) if significant medical or mental
health concerns are present, they must be reasonably well
controlled.”71 A person requesting genital reconstructive surgery has
additional criteria that are: “(1) twelve continuous months of hormone
therapy as appropriate to the patient’s gender goals, and (2) twelve
continuous months of living in a gender role that is congruent with
their gender identity.”72 The rationale for these last two criteria are
66

Id. at 55; see De Cuypere et al., Sexual And Physical Health After Sex
Reassignment Surgery, ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV., 34(6), 679-90 (2005); Gijs &
Brewaeys, Surgical Treatment Of Gender Dysphoria In Adults And Adolescents:
Recent Developments, Effectiveness, And Challenges, ANN. REV. OF SEX RSCH., 18,
178-224 (2007); Klein & Gorzalka, Sexual Functioning In Transsexuals Following
Hormone Therapy And Genital Surgery: A Review (CME), THE J. OF SEXUAL MED.
6(11) 2922-39, (2009); Pfafflin & Junge, Thirty Years Of International Follow-Up
Studies After Sex Reassignment Surgery: A Comprehensive Review, 1961-1991,
INT’L J. OF TRANSGENDERISM (1998) (discussing the beneficial outcomes of GCS,
including subjective well-being, cosmesis and sexual function).
67
WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 3, at 33 (A qualified mental health
professional is one that is comfortable and experienced working with transsexual,
transgender, and gender non-conforming people.).
68
Id. at 58.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 59.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 60.
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that the experience of living for twelve months as their preferred
gender identity “provides ample opportunity for patients to experience
and socially adjust in their desired gender role, before undergoing
irreversible surgery.”73 A change in gender role can bring significant
personal and social consequences, so the decision to receive GCS
should include “an awareness of what the familial, interpersonal,
educational, vocational, economic, and legal challenges are likely to
be, so that people can function successfully in their gender role.” 74 The
criteria of living for twelve months as an individual’s congruent gender
identity is the crux of why transgender individuals within the prison
system consistently hit a wall when it comes to requesting GCS and its
medical necessity. 75 Medical experts inside the prison system disagree
on whether transgender individuals can actually experience living as
their expressed gender roles for the required period, because within
many prison systems in the United States, inmates are housed based on
their genitalia.76
C.

WPATH Standards of Care Applicability to
Transgender Individuals Within the Prison System

For many people diagnosed with gender dysphoria, the
intensity of the associated distress meets the criteria for a formal
diagnosis as a mental disorder. 77 The WPATH Standards of Care state
that a diagnosis of gender dysphoria “is not a license for stigmatization
or for the deprivation of civil and human rights.”78 This means that a
diagnosis of gender dysphoria should not go to the identity of the
person but describe the person’s struggle within their diagnosis.79
For transgender individuals with diagnoses of gender
dysphoria within the prison system, access to medical care, including
73

Id.
Id. at 61.
75
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 88 (1st Cir. 2014) (discussing the district court’s
disagreement with Kosilek’s medical expert that a real-life experience could not
occur in prison); Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 771 (9th Cir. 2019)
(discussing that the WPATH Standards of Care explicitly state that for transgender
individuals living in an institutional environment, the standards should “mirror that
which would be available to them if they were living in a non-institutional setting
within the same community.”).
76
See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 769. But see Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73.
77
WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 3, at 5.
78
Id.
79
Id.
74
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hormone therapy and GCS is largely based on policies within the
various Departments of Corrections (“DOC”), as well as how inmates
are housed.80 However, the WPATH Standards of Care emphasize that
any and all guidelines and treatment options put forth in its standards
apply to people in institutional environments, including prisons.81 The
WPATH Standards of Care assert that “[p]eople should not be
discriminated against in their access to appropriate health care based
on where they live, including institutional environments such as
prisons or long/intermediate health care facilities.” 82 Further, health
care for transgender people living in an institutional environment
should be the same that would be available to them if they were living
in a non-institutional setting within the same community. 83 If there is
not a medical or healthcare professional within the DOC that has
significant experience in dealing with gender dysphoria or transgender
individuals, the WPATH Standards of Care express that “it is
appropriate to obtain outside consultation from the professionals who
are knowledgeable about this specialized area of health care.” 84 The
WPATH Standards of Care also aver that “reasonable
accommodations in the institutional environment” can be made in the
delivery of care for transgender individuals, and “denial of needed
changes in gender role or access to treatments, including GCS, on the
basis of residence in an institution are not reasonable accommodations
under the WPATH Standards of Care.”85
Policies within the DOC system provide different reasons for
the availability or unavailability of GCS to transgender inmates. 86
Some DOCs point to safety and security concerns regarding
availability of GCS for transgender individuals, rather than relying on
the standards of care relevant to the medical community in relation to
transgender individuals.87 In other instances, some judges have found
that WPATH Standards of Care outweigh DOC safety and security
80

See Edmo 935 F.3d at 769; see also Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73.
WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra, note 3, at 67 (emphasis added).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
86
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 92-94 (1st Cir. 2014) (discussing the
Massachusetts DOC’s security concerns for postoperative male-to-female inmates
being housed in an all-female prison population should be given great deference
because of the DOC’s expertise in the area).
87
Id. at 73-74.
81
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concerns, or have found that the stated safety and security concerns
lack merit.88 These safety and security concerns play a significant part
in resolving whether denying GCS to a transgender inmate is a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 89
V.

EXAMINING CASES
CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

OF

TRANSGENDER INMATES AND THE

The Ninth Circuit and the Creation of the Circuit
Split

The question of whether denial of GCS for a transgender
inmate with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria constitutes a violation of
the Eighth Amendment is a fairly current debate among the legal
community. The Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Edmo v. Corizon,
Inc.90 has created a split among the few circuits who have answered
the question.91
In Edmo, the petitioner, Adree Edmo (“Edmo”), identified and
was living as a woman for several years. 92 Although Edmo had been
prescribed hormone injections and regularly had access to and attended
psychotherapy, she felt continued “distress and frustration” because
she was still identified by her assigned sex at birth as well as “disgust”
toward her male genitalia. 93 Additionally, Edmo attempted suicide and
self-castration multiple times because of her inability to suppress her
feelings stemming from her gender dysphoria through hormones and
psychotherapy.94 Edmo was eventually evaluated for GCS after her
attempts at self-castration by the DOC’s mental health professional. 95
She was ultimately denied GCS based on the medical provider’s
conclusion that she “did not meet the criteria” and therefore GCS “was
not medically necessary.”96 Edmo sued the DOC alleging violation of
88

Id. at 110-11 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
See 774 F.3d at 70; Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019); But see Edmo
v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019).
90
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767.
91
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 53, 92-94 (1st Cir. 2014); see also Gibson v. Collier,
920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019); Edmo, 935 F.3d 757.
92
935 F.3d at 771-72.
93
Id. at 772.
94
Id. at 773.
95
Id.
96
Id.
89
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her Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment,
as well as an injunction requiring the DOC to provide her with GCS.97
The district court found for Edmo, and the DOC appealed. 98 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision and held
that the Indiana DOC was deliberately indifferent to Edmo’s serious
medical need.99 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s grant of the injunction that Edmo be provided with GCS.100
The Ninth Circuit began its opinion by defining gender
dysphoria using the DSM-5 and emphasizing that the WPATH
Standards Of Care are the internationally recognized and accepted
standards of care regarding transgender individuals.101 The court
compared the WPATH Standards of Care to the “standards” of the
DOC medical provider who had denied Edmo GCS and concluded that
“Dr. Eliason did not follow accepted standards of care in the area of
transgender health care.”102 The court further criticized Dr. Eliason’s
criteria as “apparently invented out of whole cloth” and “so far afield
from the WPATH standards that we cannot characterize his decision
as a flexible application of or deviation from those standards.” 103 This
flows directly from the holding in Estelle v. Gamble,104 where the
Supreme Court stated that while difference of opinion among medical
professionals will not create a basis for an Eighth Amendment claim,
that difference of opinion will only be insufficient for an Eighth
97

Id. at 776-77.
Id. at 780.
99
Id. at 785.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 769 (“And many of the major medical and mental health groups in the
United States – including the American Medical Association, the American Medical
Student Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American
Psychological Association, the American Family Practice Association, the
Endocrine Society, the National Association of Social Workers, the American
Academy of Plastic Surgeons, the American College of Surgeons, Health
Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality, the HIV Medicine Association, the
Lesbian, Bisexual, Gat and Transgender Physician Assistant Caucus, and Mental
Health America – recognize the WPATH Standards of Care as representing the
consensus of the medical and mental health communities regarding the appropriate
treatment for transgender and gender dysphoric individuals.”).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 791 (Dr. Eliason’s standards were stated to be “(1) ‘congenital
malformations or ambiguous genitalia,’ (2) ‘severe and devastating dysphoria that is
primarily due to genitals,’ or (3) ‘some type of medical problem in which endogenous
sexual hormones were causing severe psychological damage.’”).
104
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976).
98
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Amendment claim if both medical opinions are accepted within the
medical community.105
The court then went on to discuss the deliberate indifference
standard as set forth in Estelle and held that “Dr. Eliason knew of and
disregarded the substantial risk of severe harm to Edmo.” 106 The Ninth
Circuit is the first court to hold that denying GCS to a transgender
inmate with gender dysphoria who meets the WPATH Standards of
Care criteria is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishment.107 The Ninth Circuit based its holding on the
medical opinions of Edmo’s experts, who established that the WPATH
Standards of Care are the medically accepted standards of care within
the transgender medical community. 108 Additionally, the court also
considered the severity of Edmo’s gender dysphoria diagnosis.109
B.

The Sister Circuits Holdings that Denying GCS For
a Transgender Inmate Is Not a Violation of The
Eighth Amendment

In contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s holding, the First and Fifth
Circuits have both held that denying a transgender inmate GCS did not
constitute deliberate indifference on the part of medical providers and
the DOC, and therefore the denial was not a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.110 Both circuits conceded that a diagnosis of gender
dysphoria constitutes a serious medical need thus satisfying the first
prong of the Estelle test.111 Both circuits found a lack of deliberate
indifference for different reasons. 112 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals in Kosilek emphasized safety and security concerns, as well
as disagreement over whether the WPATH Standards of Care are
widely accepted within the medical community in holding that denial
of GCS does not violate the Eighth Amendment. 113 The Fifth Circuit’s
105

Edmo, 935 F.3d 757, 769 (This was also supported by the experts that Edmo put
forth at her evidentiary hearing, who described Dr. Eliason’s “criteria” as “bizarre .
. . I just don’t understand what Dr. Eliason is talking about here.”).
106
Id. at 793.
107
Id. at 786.
108
Id. at 785.
109
Id. at 787-91.
110
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212
(5th Cir. 2019).
111
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219.
112
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91-92; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 225-26.
113
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 92.
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holding in Gibson similarly emphasized the debate on WPATH
Standards of Care and additionally interpreted the Eighth Amendment
from a textualist perspective. 114
i.

The First Circuit

In Kosilek, petitioner Michelle Kosilek was born biologically
male, but identifies as female. 115 She was diagnosed with gender
dysphoria at the start of her incarceration. 116 While awaiting her
criminal trial, she twice attempted suicide and made one attempt at
self-castration as a result of her frustration at being anatomically
male.117 Although she has not attempted self-mutilation for the
duration of the last twenty years, she has been fighting for GCS since
her sentence began. 118 In her first attempt at fighting for GCS, the
district court denied a finding of deliberate indifference due to the
DOC’s unawareness of Kosilek’s serious medical need for more than
“supportive therapy” for her gender dysphoria. 119 Although the district
court found for the DOC, it made clear that a failure to provide more
than psychotherapy to Kosilek in the future could amount to an Eighth
Amendment violation since the DOC was now on notice that gender
dysphoria was found to constitute a serious medical need. 120 In
response, the DOC revamped its “freeze frame” policy on medical
treatment, and amended the policy to allow inmates to receive
additional medical treatment beyond the level they were receiving
prior to incarceration. 121 As a result of this change in policy, Kosilek
received hormones, gender-appropriate clothing, and a procedure that
permanently removed her facial hair, in addition to continued
psychotherapy.122
114

Gibson, 920 F.3d at 227.
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 68.
116
Id. at 69-70.
117
Id. at 69.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. A “freeze frame” policy is one that does not allow for medical treatment
beyond what an inmate received prior to becoming incarcerated. An example would
be where an inmate was receiving hormone treatment for gender dysphoria prior to
incarceration, and due to the “freeze frame” policy, hormone levels would not be
allowed to be increased as needed once the prisoner started his or her incarceration.
Id.
122
Id. at 69-70.
115
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Since receiving this additional treatment, Kosilek still felt a
deep sense of distress regarding her male genitalia, and was ultimately
assessed for GCS by an outside medical provider, the Fenway Center,
that was experienced in transgender health. 123 The Fenway Center’s
report stated that Kosilek should receive GCS because she fell within
the WPATH Standards of Care guidelines, and GCS would “allow
Michelle full relief of her gender dysphoria” as well as “increase her
chance for survival.”124 Despite this report, the DOC turned to another
expert who determined that “surgery . . . was not medically
necessary”125 for Kosilek and ultimately denied Kosilek’s request for
GCS.126
In its holding, the First Circuit relied on a single expert’s
disagreement with the WPATH Standards of Care, in addition to the
DOC’s safety and security concerns about allowing Kosilek’s GCS to
move forward.127 The outside expert, Dr. Osborne, opined that she
believed that a penal institution was not able to satisfy the WPATH
Standards of Care requirement of control of comorbid conditions, and
therefore that standard could not be applied to incarcerated persons. 128
Although the Fenway Center medical experts disagreed and pointed to
the WPATH Standards of Care’s direction that “persons receiving
treatment should continue to receive appropriate treatment . . . after
incarceration,”129 the court reasoned that there were two alternate and
adequate choices that the DOC could take in its decision.130 The court
said that “the law is clear” where two alternative courses of medical
treatment exist, it is not the place of the court to “second guess medical
judgments” or “require that the DOC adopt the more compassionate of
two adequate options.”131
With respect to safety and security concerns, the court
determined that the reasonable concerns raised by the DOC regarding
post-operative, male-to-female transgender individuals takes “no great
stretch of the imagination.”132 The DOC’s primary concerns were not
123

Id. at 71.
Id.
125
Id. at 104.
126
Id. at 71.
127
Id. at 72.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 90.
131
Id.
132
Id.
124
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related to Kosilek’s safety at all. The DOC’s first safety concern was
that housing a formerly male inmate with a history of domestic
violence within a female prison population would create safety
concerns for the other female prisoners because some of them had been
subjected to domestic violence prior to incarceration.133 Similarly,
DOC’s second concern did not examine Kosilek’s personal safety.
The DOC averred that providing GCS to Kosilek would essentially be
giving into her “desired benefit” and that the flood gates would burst
open with threats of suicide by all prisoners who are denied their
“desired benefits” in order to get their way. 134 The court held that great
deference should be given to DOC concerns about safety and security
because they have the experience and greater knowledge needed to
make those kinds of determinations. 135
The court’s final holding rested on the fact that because the
DOC had chosen to provide care that falls just short of providing GCS,
there was no showing of deliberate indifference to Kosilek’s serious
medical need.136 Thus, the court held that there was no Eighth
Amendment violation.137 However, the First Circuit’s holding in
Kosilek essentially placed a blanket ban on GCS availability for
transgender inmates, as the Fifth Circuit pointed out in its opinion in
Gibson v. Collier.138
ii.

The Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gibson relied heavily on the
First Circuit’s holding in Kosilek. The court ultimately held that the
denial of GCS to a transgender inmate is not a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.139 In addition to relying on the Kosilek opinion, the Fifth
Circuit also interpreted the Eighth Amendment from a textualist
perspective.140
In Gibson, the petitioner, Vanessa Lynn Gibson (“Gibson”),
was born male but identified as female and was diagnosed with gender

133

Id. at 93 (emphasis added).
Id. at 94.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 224-25 (5th Cir. 2019).
139
Id.
140
Id. at 226-27.
134
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dysphoria at the age of fifteen. 141 After being incarcerated for
aggravated murder, Gibson sought GCS to alleviate her gender
dysphoria.142 However, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(“TDCJ”) denied the surgery because of a policy that did not allow
GCS as a treatment option for gender dysphoria.143 Gibson sued
claiming a violation of her Eighth Amendment rights, alleging that the
TDCJ’s policy created a de facto blanket ban on GCS as a treatment
option for transgender inmates.144 Here, Gibson did not seek an
injunction to be provided surgery, but merely to be evaluated for GCS
within the TDCJ policy.145
The Fifth Circuit, like both the First and Ninth Circuits,
conceded that gender dysphoria is a serious medical need and therefore
satisfies the first prong of Estelle’s two-prong test.146 However, unlike
the Ninth Circuit in Edmo, the Fifth Circuit held that there was no
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need if a “genuine debate”
exists within the medical community. 147
To support this
determination, the court proffered what is essentially a brand new
standard of “universal acceptance” by the medical community 148 to
determine the acceptable standard of care, instead of following the
precedent that was established over forty years ago in Estelle.149 The
Estelle precedent states that the standard of care is measured by what
is widely accepted within the medical community.150 To further
bolster its conclusion, the court cited to three experts that testified for
the State, who alleged that there are “less invasive procedures that are
considered adequate.”151
The Fifth Circuit in Gibson attempted to create a new way to
interpret the Eighth Amendment in determining whether a violation
has occurred.152 The court said that the text and original understanding
141

Id. at 216-17.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 218.
145
Id.
146
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976).
147
Gibson, 920 F.3d at 220.
148
Id.
149
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98.
150
Id.
151
Gibson, 920 F.3d at 222. The less invasive procedures include hormones and
access to psychotherapy. Id.
152
Id.
142
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of the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” language means that
the punishment must be both cruel and unusual.153 The court reasoned
that denying GCS was not unusual because GCS is not widely
practiced in prisons.154 When Gibson was decided, only California in
2017, had performed GCS on a transgender prison inmate. 155
California only performed the GCS after a lawsuit was filed, but there
was ultimately a settlement agreement that included the surgery. 156
The court concluded that “there is no basis in Eighth Amendment
precedent as well as the text or original understanding of the
Constitution that would allow a holding of deliberate indifference for
not taking sides in a medical debate that is widely disputed within the
medical community.”157
VI.

THE PROPOSED RULE AND WHY THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED CERTIORARI

While the Ninth Circuit held that denial of GCS to a
transgender inmate with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria violated the
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, this was
only a small win for the transgender and prison community. 158 The
Idaho DOC ultimately petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari,
which was denied. 159 The Supreme Court should have granted
certiorari in this instance because it would have given the Court the
opportunity to make a final and binding decision on the issue, and thus
establish binding precedent that would solidify the WPATH Standards
of Care as the medically accepted standard of care in the field of
transgender health.
For too long, transgender inmates have been subjected to
significant disrespect, trauma, and abuse, not only at the hands of
prison officials and fellow inmates, and in some instances even the
judges presiding over their cases.160 In the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
153

Id.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019).
159
ID DOC v. Edmo, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020).
160
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 772 (discussing the several disciplinary actions Edmo faced at
the hands of prison officials for presenting as female, including wearing makeup and
wearing her hair in feminine hairstyles).
154
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Gibson, Judge Ho repeatedly deadnamed the plaintiff, referring to
Vanessa Lynn Gibson as “he” or by her given name at birth, “Scott.” 161
Not only does Judge Ho’s refusal to recognize Gibson’s gender
constitute a great disrespect towards Gibson as an individual, it also
sets the outcome of the decision without actually having to read the
words of the opinion itself. One can infer from his usage of the wrong
pronoun when referring to Gibson that the decision has already been
made in favor of the DOC. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion
in Edmo references several instances where Edmo was given citations
by prison officers for simply presenting as feminine and identifying as
her preferred gender.162
A.

The Supreme
Certiorari

Court

Should

Have

Granted

The Supreme Court should have granted certiorari to the
Indiana DOC. Although it was the DOC in this case that petitioned the
Court to reverse the lower court’s decision and ultimately reverse the
ruling that it needed to provide Edmo GCS, it would have given the
Court the opportunity to clarify what medical standards are required
for transgender inmates under the Eighth Amendment. The rule that
should be adopted by the Court is one that provides GCS for a
transgender inmate with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and who
satisfies the requirements under the WPATH Standards of Care. This
rule will arguably prevent several transgender inmates from
succumbing to their associated comorbid conditions such as depression
and self-harm and will ultimately save lives by preventing suicide
among those transgender inmates.
B.

The Proposed Rule

The WPATH Standards of Care list several comorbid
conditions that are associated with a diagnosis of gender dysphoria. 163
Comorbid conditions can include anxiety, depression, self-harm,
Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019). “Deadnaming” is using the name
that a transgender person was given at birth and no longer uses upon transitioning.
Deadname,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/deadname (last visited Apr. 2, 2021).
162
Edmo, 935 F.3d 757.
163
WPATH STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 3, at 24.
161
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compulsivity, sexual concerns, and psychiatric disorders.164 The
WPATH Standards of Care states that if these conditions are left
untreated, it can “complicate the process of gender identity exploration
and resolution of gender dysphoria.”165 Thus, hormone therapy or
psychotherapy alone are not sufficient for transgender inmates who
have severe diagnoses of gender dysphoria. The denial of GCS or even
evaluation for GCS may likely lead to higher rates of suicide. By
creating a rule that a DOC provides and pays for GCS for a transgender
inmate who presents severe gender dysphoria and falls within the
WPATH Standards of Care requirements for GCS eligibility can
decrease the likelihood of comorbid conditions and death among
transgender inmates.
Additionally, housing transgender inmates based on their
biological sex and expressed gender without GCS opens up the door
for abuse by prison officials and other inmates. According to the
National Center for Transgender Equality (“NCTE”), transgender
inmates are exposed to “horrific rates of abuse by both staff and their
fellow inmates.”166 A survey by the U.S. Transgender Survey
(“USTS”) found that “transgender people are ten times as likely to be
sexually assaulted by their fellow inmates and five times as likely to
be sexually assaulted by staff.” 167 The NCTE also states that
transgender prisoners are more likely to face “lengthy stays in solitary
confinement.”168 This is not conducive to the mental health of a
transgender inmate who has a diagnosis of gender dysphoria, and
additionally, it is more likely to result in attempts at self-harm.
Accordingly, transgender inmates should be placed in a facility based
on their gender identity and not their assigned sex at birth.
The First and Fifth Circuits in Kosilek and Gibson both
expressed security concerns about housing and moving transgender
inmates to a prison population based on transgender inmates’ gender
identity rather than their assigned sex at birth. 169 The security concerns
asserted by the DOC in Kosilek stated that transferring Kosilek to a
female detention center increased the risk of escape and fear among
164

Id.
Id. at 25.
166
Police, Jails & Prisons, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL.,
https://www.transequality.org/issues/police-jails-prisons. (last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2014); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d
212, 230 (5th Cir. 2019) (Barksdale, J., dissenting).
165
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the other female prisoners who had formerly been subjected to physical
and mental abuse by their partners.170 However, the NCTE states that
“[w]hile any prisoner is capable of engaging in abusive conduct, there
is simply no evidence to believe that transgender women present any
more risk to their fellow women prisoners than other women.” 171
Additionally, the NCTE states that “a growing number of corrections
facilities for youth and adults have successfully housed transgender
women alongside other women without experiencing any incidents of
abuse by transgender women or other prisoners.” 172 To show evidence
of this, the NCTE cites a statewide study in California which found
that “when transgender women are automatically housed with men,
they were 13 times more likely to be sexually assaulted than male
prisoners in the same facilities.” 173 This shows that the Indiana DOC
security concerns as stated in Kosilek lack merit, and that transgender
inmates should be housed based on their expressed gender identity and
not on their assigned sex at birth.
All circuits that have denied GCS for a transgender inmate have
also conceded that gender dysphoria is a diagnosis that has a serious
medical need.174 Additionally, all circuits have cited the expert
testimony of Dr. Cynthia Osborne.175 In Kosilek and Gibson, the First
and Fifth Circuits cited Dr. Osborne’s expert testimony in holding that
denying GCS for a transgender inmate does not constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation when there are “alternative methods
available.”176 These alternative methods that Dr. Osborne advocated
for in Kosilek and Gibson referred to hormone therapy and
psychotherapy.177 However, in the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Edmo,
the court recognized that Dr. Osborne had changed her views on
whether GCS for transgender inmates is medically necessary. 178
170

Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 74.
Ending Abuse of Transgender Prisoners: A guide to Winning Policy Change In
Jails And Prisons, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. (2018)
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/EndingAbuseofTransgend
erPrisoners.pdf.
172
Id. at 20.
173
Id. at 20-21.
174
See Edmo v. Corizon, 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019); Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d
63 (1st Cir. 2014); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2019).
175
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795-96; Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 22122.
176
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221-22.
177
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 70-73; Gibson, 920 F.3d at 221-22.
178
Edmo, 935 F.3d at 795-96.
171
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Referencing Dr. Osborne’s response in Kosilek regarding whether she
views GCS as medically necessary, the Ninth Circuit states “[t]o the
extent this vague portrait of Dr. Osborne’s testimony conveys her
belief that GCS is never medically necessary, she has apparently
changed her view in the more than ten years since she testified [in
Kosilek].”179 Dr. Osborne now views GCS as medically necessary “for
some, though not all, persons with [gender dysphoria], including some
prison inmates.”180 Dr. Osborne’s changed opinion on GCS weakens
the holdings in Kosilek and Gibson because the First and Fifth Circuits
gave ample weight to Dr. Osborne’s testimony in their decisions. 181
Dr. Osborne has changed her views on GCS, and now opines that it is
medically necessary for some transgender inmates. Thus, if Kosilek
and Gibson had been decided today with the same weight given to the
expert testimony of Dr. Osborne, the results may likely have come out
on the same side as the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Edmo.
The decisions rendered in Kosilek, Gibson, and Edmo show
that the debate of GCS for transgender inmates in the medical and legal
realm are still at odds. Fortunately, the change in Dr. Osborne’s
opinion shows that the medical community is moving toward a
consensus that the WPATH Standards of Care are the appropriate
standards for transgender health and well-being. Additionally, the
significant comorbid conditions associated with gender dysphoria
unambiguously show that gender dysphoria is a diagnosis that
constitutes a serious medical need, and thus satisfies the first prong of
the test for cruel and unusual punishment established in Estelle.182
Michelle Kosilek’s access to a variety of treatments for her gender
dysphoria is a step in the right direction, but the First Circuit’s holding
does not address the potential for future instances of suicide and selfmutilation, which can affect future transgender inmates. This in itself
evidences a deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, the exact
type of treatment that the Eighth Amendment proscribes.183 The
Supreme Court had the opportunity to create a rule that would
significantly reduce the risk of suicide and self-harm among
transgender inmates, thus bringing awareness and notice to the serious
medical need of gender dysphoria and likely reducing any deliberate
179

Id. at 796.
Id. (emphasis added).
181
Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 108-110; Gibson, 935 F.3d at 795-96.
182
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
183
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
180
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indifference to it. The Court here had the chance for a home run but
chose instead to not even step up to the plate.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Although there has been significant progress regarding the
LGBTQ community, the legal system is still far behind on the issue of
transgender inmates. Their care and access to GCS is an important
issue that needs to be addressed. As of this writing, only two
transgender inmates have received GCS while in prison, one of them
being Adree Edmo.184 This should be seen as light at the end of the
tunnel, but due to the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on the issue,
many transgender inmates like Michelle Kosilek and Vanessa Lynn
Gibson may very well die trying to fight for their right to receive GCS.
Outside of the prison system, GCS is readily available – one must
simply fall within the purview of the requirements put forth in the
WPATH Standards of Care to be deemed eligible. This begs the
question of why transgender inmates are fighting for their basic right
to live as they truly are while those outside the system are eligible as
long as they meet the requirements.
In the words of Lisa Harvey, a transgender woman, regarding
GCS: “It’s a lot of money, but it’s nothing compared to the
psychological price of waiting for something you’ve wanted all your
life.”185 The courts should require that GCS be provided for
transgender inmates who have a diagnosis of gender dysphoria and
satisfy the requirements of the WPATH Standards of Care. Denying
GCS to an individual who falls under these requirements is taking
away a life that is worth saving and would be acting with deliberate
184

Tommy Simmons, Idaho Transgender Inmate Becomes 2nd in Country to
Receive Gender Confirmation Surgery, IDAHO PRESS (Jul. 27, 2020)
https://www.idahopress.com/news/local/idaho-transgender-inmate-becomes-2ndin-country-to-receive-gender-confirmation-surgery/article_f2aad619-2735-50408904-2a762f0734e9.html; Associated Press, California Murder Convict Becomes
First U.S. Inmates to Have State Funded Sex Reassignment Surgery, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 6, 2017, 2:20 PM) https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-inmate-sexreassignment-20170106-story.html.
185
Lisa Harvey, ‘I Don’t Need a Vagina to Feel Like a Woman’: Why Changing
Gender Wasn’t About Switching One Body For Another – It Was About Saving My
Life,
GLAMOUR
MAG.
(Nov.
18,
2020)
https://www.glamourmagazine.co.uk/article/charlie-hill-trans-interview.
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indifference to a diagnosis with a serious medical need. It constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The
Court will very likely be asked to consider this issue again in the future.
It is unclear just how much time will pass and how many transgender
inmates will die before the Court recognizes that transgender inmate
lives are worth saving.
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